The Application’s main role is to execute blocks decided (a.k.a. finalized) by consensus. The decided blocks are the consensus’s main output to the (replicated) Application. With ABCI, the application only interacts with consensus at decision time. This restricted mode of interaction prevents numerous features for the Application, including many scalability improvements that are now better understood than when ABCI was first written. For example, many ideas proposed to improve scalability can be boiled down to “make the block proposers do work, so the network does not have to”. This includes optimizations such as transaction level signature aggregation, state transition proofs, etc. Furthermore, many new security properties cannot be achieved in the current paradigm, as the Application cannot require validators to do more than executing the transactions contained in finalized blocks. This includes features such as threshold cryptography, and guaranteed IBC connection attempts.
ABCI 2.0 addresses these limitations by allowing the application to intervene at three key places of
consensus execution: (a) at the moment a new proposal is to be created, (b) at the moment a
proposal is to be validated, and (c) at the moment a (precommit) vote is sent/received.
The new interface allows block proposers to perform application-dependent
work in a block through the PrepareProposal
method (a); and validators to perform application-dependent work
and checks in a proposed block through the ProcessProposal
method (b); and applications to require their validators
to do more than just validate blocks through the ExtendVote
and VerifyVoteExtensions
methods (c).
Furthermore, ABCI 2.0 coalesces {BeginBlock
, [DeliverTx
], EndBlock
} into FinalizeBlock
, as a
simplified, efficient way to deliver a decided block to the Application.
Methods can be classified into four categories: consensus, mempool, info, and state-sync.
The first time a new blockchain is started, CometBFT calls InitChain
. From then on, method
FinalizeBlock
is executed upon the decision of each block, resulting in an updated Application
state. During the execution of an instance of consensus, which decides the block for a given
height, and before method FinalizeBlock
is called, methods PrepareProposal
, ProcessProposal
,
ExtendVote
, and VerifyVoteExtension
may be called several times. See
CometBFT’s expected behavior for details on the possible
call sequences of these methods.
InitChain: This method initializes the blockchain. CometBFT calls it once upon genesis.
PrepareProposal: It allows the block
proposer to perform application-dependent work in a block before proposing it.
This enables, for instance, batch optimizations to a block, which has been empirically
demonstrated to be a key component for improved performance. Method PrepareProposal
is called
every time CometBFT is about to broadcast a Proposal message and validValue is nil
.
CometBFT gathers outstanding transactions from the
mempool, generates a block header, and uses them to create a block to propose. Then, it calls
RequestPrepareProposal
with the newly created proposal, called raw proposal. The Application
can make changes to the raw proposal, such as reordering, adding and removing transactions, before returning the
(potentially) modified proposal, called prepared proposal in the ResponsePrepareProposal
.
The logic modifying the raw proposal MAY be non-deterministic.
ProcessProposal: It allows a validator to perform application-dependent work in a proposed block. This enables features such as immediate block execution, and allows the Application to reject invalid blocks.
CometBFT calls it when it receives a proposal and validValue is nil
.
The Application cannot modify the proposal at this point but can reject it if
invalid. If that is the case, the consensus algorithm will prevote nil
on the proposal, which has
strong liveness implications for CometBFT. As a general rule, the Application
SHOULD accept a prepared proposal passed via ProcessProposal
, even if a part of
the proposal is invalid (e.g., an invalid transaction); the Application can
ignore the invalid part of the prepared proposal at block execution time.
The logic in ProcessProposal
MUST be deterministic.
ExtendVote: It allows applications to let their
validators do more than just validate within consensus. ExtendVote
allows applications to
include non-deterministic data, opaque to the consensus algorithm, to precommit messages (the final round of
voting). The data, called vote extension, will be broadcast and received together with the
vote it is extending, and will be made available to the Application in the next height,
in the rounds where the local process is the proposer.
CometBFT calls ExtendVote
when the consensus algorithm is about to send a non-nil
precommit message.
If the Application does not have vote extension information to provide at that time, it returns
a 0-length byte array as its vote extension.
The logic in ExtendVote
MAY be non-deterministic.
VerifyVoteExtension: It allows
validators to validate the vote extension data attached to a precommit message. If the validation
fails, the whole precommit message will be deemed invalid and ignored by consensus algorithm.
This has a negative impact on liveness, i.e., if vote extensions repeatedly cannot be
verified by correct validators, the consensus algorithm may not be able to finalize a block even if sufficiently
many (+2/3) validators send precommit votes for that block. Thus, VerifyVoteExtension
should be implemented with special care.
As a general rule, an Application that detects an invalid vote extension SHOULD
accept it in ResponseVerifyVoteExtension
and ignore it in its own logic. CometBFT calls it when
a process receives a precommit message with a (possibly empty) vote extension, for the current height. It is not called for precommit votes received after the height is concluded but while waiting to accumulate more precommit votes.
The logic in VerifyVoteExtension
MUST be deterministic.
FinalizeBlock: It delivers a decided block to the
Application. The Application must execute the transactions in the block deterministically and
update its state accordingly. Cryptographic commitments to the block and transaction results,
returned via the corresponding parameters in ResponseFinalizeBlock
, are included in the header
of the next block. CometBFT calls it when a new block is decided.
When calling FinalizeBlock
with a block, the consensus algorithm run by CometBFT guarantees
that at least one non-byzantine validator has run ProcessProposal
on that block.
Commit: Instructs the Application to persist its
state. It is a fundamental part of CometBFT’s crash-recovery mechanism that ensures the
synchronization between CometBFT and the Application upon recovery. CometBFT calls it just after
having persisted the data returned by calls to ResponseFinalizeBlock
. The Application can now discard
any state or data except the one resulting from executing the transactions in the decided block.
CheckTx
on all outstanding transactions in the mempool after calling Commit
for a block.Info: Used to sync CometBFT with the Application during a handshake that happens upon recovery, or on startup when state-sync is used.
Query: This method can be used to query the Application for information about the application state.
State sync allows new nodes to rapidly bootstrap by discovering, fetching, and applying state machine (application) snapshots instead of replaying historical blocks. For more details, see the state sync documentation.
New nodes discover and request snapshots from other nodes in the P2P network.
A CometBFT node that receives a request for snapshots from a peer will call
ListSnapshots
on its Application. The Application returns the list of locally available
snapshots.
Note that the list does not contain the actual snapshots but metadata about them: height at which
the snapshot was taken, application-specific verification data and more (see
snapshot data type for more details). After receiving a
list of available snapshots from a peer, the new node can offer any of the snapshots in the list to
its local Application via the OfferSnapshot
method. The Application can check at this point the
validity of the snapshot metadata.
Snapshots may be quite large and are thus broken into smaller “chunks” that can be
assembled into the whole snapshot. Once the Application accepts a snapshot and
begins restoring it, CometBFT will fetch snapshot “chunks” from existing nodes.
The node providing “chunks” will fetch them from its local Application using
the LoadSnapshotChunk
method.
As the new node receives “chunks” it will apply them sequentially to the local
application with ApplySnapshotChunk
. When all chunks have been applied, the
Application’s AppHash
is retrieved via an Info
query.
To ensure that the sync proceeded correctly, CometBFT compares the local Application’s AppHash
to the AppHash
stored on the blockchain (verified via
light client verification).
In summary:
ListSnapshots: Used by nodes to discover available snapshots on peers.
OfferSnapshot: When a node receives a snapshot from a peer, CometBFT uses this method to offer the snapshot to the Application.
LoadSnapshotChunk: Used by CometBFT to retrieve snapshot chunks from the Application to send to peers.
ApplySnapshotChunk: Used by CometBFT to hand snapshot chunks to the Application.
Additionally, there is a Flush method that is called on every connection, and an Echo method that is used for debugging.
More details on managing state across connections can be found in the section on Managing Application State.
PrepareProposal
stands on the consensus algorithm critical path,
i.e., CometBFT cannot make progress while this method is being executed.
Hence, if the Application takes a long time preparing a proposal,
the default value of TimeoutPropose might not be sufficient
to accommodate the method’s execution and validator nodes might time out and prevote nil
.
The proposal, in this case, will probably be rejected and a new round will be necessary.
Timeouts are automatically increased for each new round of a height and, if the execution of PrepareProposal
is bound, eventually TimeoutPropose will be long enough to accommodate the execution of PrepareProposal
.
However, relying on this self adaptation could lead to performance degradation and, therefore,
operators are suggested to adjust the initial value of TimeoutPropose in CometBFT’s configuration file,
in order to suit the needs of the particular application being deployed.
This is particularly important if applications implement immediate execution.
To implement this technique, proposers need to execute the block being proposed within PrepareProposal
, which could take longer than TimeoutPropose.
ABCI applications must implement deterministic finite-state machines to be
securely replicated by the CometBFT consensus engine. This means block execution
must be strictly deterministic: given the same
ordered set of transactions, all nodes will compute identical responses, for all
successive FinalizeBlock
calls. This is critical because the
responses are included in the header of the next block, either via a Merkle root
or directly, so all nodes must agree on exactly what they are.
For this reason, it is recommended that application state is not exposed to any
external user or process except via the ABCI connections to a consensus engine
like CometBFT. The Application must only change its state based on input
from block execution (FinalizeBlock
calls), and not through
any other kind of request. This is the only way to ensure all nodes see the same
transactions and compute the same results.
Applications that implement immediate execution (execute the blocks
that are about to be proposed, in PrepareProposal
, or that require validation, in ProcessProposal
) produce a new candidate state before a block is decided.
The state changes caused by processing those
proposed blocks must never replace the previous state until FinalizeBlock
confirms
that the proposed block was decided and Commit
is invoked for it.
The same is true to Applications that quickly accept blocks and execute the
blocks optimistically in parallel with the remaining consensus steps to save
time during FinalizeBlock
; they must only apply state changes in Commit
.
Additionally, vote extensions or the validation thereof (via ExtendVote
or
VerifyVoteExtension
) must never have side effects on the current state.
They can only be used when their data is provided in a RequestPrepareProposal
call but, again,
without side effects to the app state.
If there is some non-determinism in the state machine, consensus will eventually fail as nodes disagree over the correct values for the block header. The non-determinism must be fixed and the nodes restarted.
Sources of non-determinism in applications may include:
See #56 for the original discussion.
Note that some methods (e.g., Query
and FinalizeBlock
) may return
non-deterministic data in the form of Info
, Log
and/or Events
fields. The
Log
is intended for the literal output from the Application’s logger, while
the Info
is any additional info that should be returned. These fields are not
included in block header computations, so we don’t need agreement on them. See
each field’s description on whether it must be deterministic or not.
Method FinalizeBlock
includes an events
field at the top level in its
Response*
, and one events
field per transaction included in the block.
Applications may respond to this ABCI 2.0 method with an event list for each executed
transaction, and a general event list for the block itself.
Events allow applications to associate metadata with transactions and blocks.
Events returned via FinalizeBlock
do not impact the consensus algorithm in any way
and instead exist to power subscriptions and queries of CometBFT state.
An Event
contains a type
and a list of EventAttributes
, which are key-value
string pairs denoting metadata about what happened during the method’s (or transaction’s)
execution. Event
values can be used to index transactions and blocks according to what
happened during their execution.
Each event has a type
which is meant to categorize the event for a particular
Response*
or Tx
. A Response*
or Tx
may contain multiple events with duplicate
type
values, where each distinct entry is meant to categorize attributes for a
particular event. Every key and value in an event’s attributes must be UTF-8
encoded strings along with the event type itself.
message Event {
string type = 1;
repeated EventAttribute attributes = 2;
}
The attributes of an Event
consist of a key
, a value
, and an index
flag. The index flag notifies the CometBFT indexer to index the attribute.
The type
and attributes
fields are non-deterministic and may vary across
different nodes in the network.
message EventAttribute {
string key = 1;
string value = 2;
bool index = 3; // nondeterministic
}
Example:
abci.ResponseFinalizeBlock{
// ...
Events: []abci.Event{
{
Type: "validator.provisions",
Attributes: []abci.EventAttribute{
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "address", Value: "...", Index: true},
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "amount", Value: "...", Index: true},
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "balance", Value: "...", Index: true},
},
},
{
Type: "validator.provisions",
Attributes: []abci.EventAttribute{
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "address", Value: "...", Index: true},
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "amount", Value: "...", Index: false},
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "balance", Value: "...", Index: false},
},
},
{
Type: "validator.slashed",
Attributes: []abci.EventAttribute{
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "address", Value: "...", Index: false},
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "amount", Value: "...", Index: true},
abci.EventAttribute{Key: "reason", Value: "...", Index: true},
},
},
// ...
},
}
CometBFT’s security model relies on the use of evidences of misbehavior. An evidence is an irrefutable proof of malicious behavior by a network participant. It is the responsibility of CometBFT to detect such malicious behavior. When malicious behavior is detected, CometBFT will gossip evidences of misbehavior to other nodes and commit the evidences to the chain once they are verified by a subset of validators. These evidences will then be passed on to the Application through ABCI++. It is the responsibility of the Application to handle evidence of misbehavior and exercise punishment.
There are two forms of evidence: Duplicate Vote and Light Client Attack. More information can be found in either data structures or accountability.
EvidenceType has the following protobuf format:
enum EvidenceType {
UNKNOWN = 0;
DUPLICATE_VOTE = 1;
LIGHT_CLIENT_ATTACK = 2;
}
The Query
and CheckTx
methods include a Code
field in their Response*
.
Field Code
is meant to contain an application-specific response code.
A response code of 0
indicates no error. Any other response code
indicates to CometBFT that an error occurred.
These methods also return a Codespace
string to CometBFT. This field is
used to disambiguate Code
values returned by different domains of the
Application. The Codespace
is a namespace for the Code
.
Methods Echo
, Info
, Commit
and InitChain
do not return errors.
An error in any of these methods represents a critical issue that CometBFT
has no reasonable way to handle. If there is an error in one
of these methods, the Application must crash to ensure that the error is safely
handled by an operator.
Method FinalizeBlock
is a special case. It contains a number of
Code
and Codespace
fields as part of type ExecTxResult
. Each of
these codes reports errors related to the transaction it is attached to.
However, FinalizeBlock
does not return errors at the top level, so the
same considerations on critical issues made for Echo
, Info
, and
InitChain
also apply here.
The handling of non-zero response codes by CometBFT is described below.
CheckTx
When CometBFT receives a ResponseCheckTx
with a non-zero Code
, the associated
transaction will not be added to CometBFT’s mempool or it will be removed if
it is already included.
ExecTxResult
(as part of FinalizeBlock
)The ExecTxResult
type delivers transaction results from the Application to CometBFT. When
CometBFT receives a ResponseFinalizeBlock
containing an ExecTxResult
with a non-zero Code
,
the response code is logged. Past Code
values can be queried by clients. As the transaction was
part of a decided block, the Code
does not influence consensus.
Query
When CometBFT receives a ResponseQuery
with a non-zero Code
, this code is
returned directly to the client that initiated the query.